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Biased Methodology Enables Equity Investment
by Defined Benefit Pension Plans
Abstract
Although pension finance theory says almost all defined benefit pension
plans sponsored by publicly traded U.S. corporations should invest
entirely in fixed income, 60% of assets are invested in equities.  I offer a
variation on the existing theory, removing the strong, but often unstated,
assumption of transparency.  The transparent (financial) model assumes
that investors and managers view the pension plan as a portfolio of
marketed assets and liabilities, a subsidiary of the operating parent, and
subject to arbitrage.  An opaque model holds that investors and
managers view the plan in operating (accounting/actuarial) terms and
value it based on earnings considerations.
Defined benefit pension plans earnings (expense) are computed using
actuarial methods and economic assumptions that systematically
anticipate expected equity returns and strongly dampen the volatility of
actual equity returns.  Thus, corporations whose plans invest in equity
overstate the financial value of their earnings and understate the volatility
of such earnings.
Under the transparent model, managers who invest in equities may be
confronted by arbitrage arguments that show equity investment injures
shareholders.  Under the opaque model, these arbitrage arguments are
not available and managers who invest in equities enjoy premium returns
to risk while those who invest in fixed income are punished by higher
costs with no apparent risk reduction.
I Introduction
Although pension finance theory says almost all defined benefit pension plans
sponsored by publicly traded U.S. corporations should invest entirely in fixed income, in
fact 60% of assets are invested in equities1.  This dissonance is not a small matter.  The
$3 trillion of pension equity investments represents about 1/4 of the U.S. equity market
capitalization.  Nor is it a transient issue.  The equity percentage has been stable for the
past 30 years even as changes in pertinent accounting, funding and tax laws have
strengthened the pension finance arguments for fixed income.
                                               
1 Pensions and Investments, January 24, 2000.
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Pension finance theory has always embedded a strong, but often unstated, transparency
assumption.  The defined benefit plan is generally modeled as a transparent financial
subsidiary of the sponsoring corporation.  It is assumed that corporate managers,
financial analysts and shareholders will see the plan this way and act accordingly.
This paper outlines a theory based on a translucent model wherein the financial aspects
of the subsidiary are filtered through an actuarial screen.
Contrasting views of pension liabilities - financial vs. actuarial
There is a stark and important difference between the actuarial and the financial pricing
principles as applied to defined benefit pension plans sponsored by publicly traded U.S.
corporations.  The actuarial principles, embodied in several documents2:
· use the expected return on plan assets to calculate plan costs (thereby anticipating
returns to risk before the risk is borne), and
· spread deviations from the expectation over several years.
The financial principles, based on pricing by arbitrage, determine the discount rate on
the liabilities by reference to publicly traded hedging assets.  These hedging assets
closely match the liability cash flows with respect to maturities and creditworthiness and
have similar correlations with the market portfolio (beta).  For the (not so) special case
where the liabilities are independent of the market portfolio and are collateralized and/or
insured, liabilities may be discounted using the term structure of riskless interest rates.
Prior to the 1960's, the great majority of pension plans was "insured" by which I mean
that life insurance companies took premiums from pension plan sponsors and promised
deferred annuities to plan participants.  Trowbridge (1952) summarized the actuarial
methods that could be used by insurance companies and others to provide sufficient
funds to meet the annuity obligations.   The applicability of these methods to non-
insurance entities allowed plan sponsors to elect to self-insure rather than buy their
annuities.  Plan sponsors who chose this route established pension trusts to act as
                                               
2 E.g., ASOP 27, FAS 87, IRC Section 412(c)3B, Trowbridge & Farr (1976), Chapter 10.
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repositories for the plan assets and to pay beneficiaries, employed independent
actuaries to perform periodic valuations of the plans, and hired money managers to see
to the investment of the plan assets.  Such plans are called "trusteed" instead of insured.
Contrasting views - financial
The trusteed plan has been interpreted by the financial community as a transparent
financial subsidiary of the sponsoring corporation (Treynor, as Bagehot, 1972).
Consistent with this perspective, Treynor proposed the "augmented balance sheet" as a
model of the plan sponsor consolidated with its pension subsidiary.  Subsequent pension
finance research has generally relied on this model.
Sharpe (1976) observes that the establishment, by ERISA3, of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) creates a put option for pension plans which may be
exercised (with restrictions)4 to the advantage of the plan and the corporation when plan
liabilities exceed plan assets.  This put value may be maximized by minimizing
contributions to the plan and by investing in equities.
Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) focus on the discrepant tax rules applied to the plan, the
corporation and its shareholders. They conclude that tax benefits are maximized by
maximizing tax-deductible contributions and by investing in fixed income.
Harrison and Sharpe (1983) demonstrate that the apparent tension between the pension
put and the tax-arbitrage theories will lead to corner solutions (all-equity or all-fixed)
depending on the pertinent variables in each corporation.
During the period 1985 through 19905, Congress passed a number of laws that reduced
the importance of the PBGC put option6 for the vast majority of employers and instituted
                                               
3 P.L. 93-406, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
4 Ippolito and Boyce (1999) state that the PBGC, from its inception, required coincident
sponsor bankruptcy.  The Pension Protection Act (contained in P.L. 100-203, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act  of 1987) amended ERISA to make this position statutorily clear.
5 Including: the Single Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (SEPPAA, contained in P.L.
99-272, The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985), the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 and the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation of 1990.
6 By requiring accelerated funding and higher PBGC premiums for poorly funded plans, by
removing the 30% net worth cap on employer liability, and by the imposition of excise tax
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a confiscatory excise tax on the reversion of excess plan assets (overfunding) upon plan
termination.  The excise tax may be characterized as a call option7 held by the federal
government against plans that accumulate assets substantially in excess of liabilities.
The diminished role of the PBGC put and the existence of the "excise tax call" means
that almost every major defined benefit plan today should be, per Harrison and Sharpe,
invested entirely in fixed income.
Bulow and Scholes (1983) and Bodie (1991) observe that employees may hold implicit
call options on well funded plans.  These call options, just like the excise tax, discourage
equity investment by defined benefit plans.
By 1983, transparent financial analysis of defined benefit pension plans demonstrated
that the inclusion of equities among plan assets was costly to shareholders for the great
majority of corporate pension plans.  Since 1983, numerous changes to the Internal
Revenue Code have made this result far stronger.  Nonetheless, most corporate plans
have continued to allocate substantial fractions of their assets to equities.
Friedman (1983) and Bodie et al (1987) conducted empirical studies to assess the
degree to which actual pension fund management is integrated with corporate financial
management (e.g., the theories identified above) in contrast to a null hypothesis (plan
decisions are independent of the corporate financial status of the plan sponsor).  They
find that corporate finance does influence pension finance but not necessarily in the
fashion theorized.
Friedman:
The unifying overall conclusion from the data is that United States
corporations do not manage the pension plans which they sponsor as if
these plans had nothing to do the corporation.  Different responses
appear to characterize firms' behavior in different contexts, but the
evidence persistently indicates clear relationships between decisions
about pension assets and liabilities and decisions about the other assets
and liabilities of the firm.  At the same time, the pattern of these
relationships is, more often than not, inconsistent with familiar hypotheses
                                                                                                                                           
penalties for failure to meet minimum funding standards.  Amir & Benartzi (1999) state that
the value of the put option has been substantially reduced and is now of second-order nature.
7 Appendix C.
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that have emerged thus far in the theoretical literature analyzing pension
aspects of corporate finance.
Bodie et al distinguish the "traditional" from the "corporate financial" perspective:
Viewed from what we shall call the "traditional perspective," pension
funds are entirely separate from the corporation and its shareholders and
should be managed without regard to either corporate financial policy or
the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
… academic theorists have built an alternative perspective from which
pension decisions are viewed as an integral part of overall corporate
financial policy.  From this perspective, defined benefit liabilities are just
one more set of fixed financial liabilities of the firm.  Pension assets, while
collateral for the liabilities, are really just assets of the firm in that the
surplus/deficit belongs to the firm's shareholders.  This integrated
perspective is then concerned with how to manage the firm's extended
balance sheet, including both its normal assets and liabilities and its
pension assets and liabilities, in the best interests of the shareholders.
Friedman, Bodie et al and all the subsequent empirical literature have found that equity
remains an asset class favored by pension plans.  It is clear that practitioners are not
marching to the beat of the theoretical drummers.
Contrasting views - actuarial
Sponsors who insured their pension plans bought group deferred annuities.  The
premiums paid each year were deducted from corporate income.  Then8, even more
than now, insurers invested in high quality fixed income assets and interest rates were
generally stable.  Thus costs were inherently smooth from year to year for stable
employee populations and insurers managed the process to reduce what little natural
volatility there was.
When sponsors switched to trusteed plans, they treated the money contributed to the
trust just as they had earlier treated the premiums paid to the insurance company; they
deducted it from operating income each year.  The actuaries that advised the plan
sponsors employed actuarial cost methods that were designed to emphasize smooth
year-to-year progressions of plan contributions/expense.  As the percentage of the plan
                                               
8 ACLI Life Insurance Fact Book (1998), Table 6.9.
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assets invested in equities grew from 17% in 1952 to 55% in 19709, actuaries
strengthened their smoothing techniques10.
In 1966, the Accounting Principles Board (APB), predecessor to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), adopted Opinion 8 (APB 8) which, with only minor
constraints, endorsed the idea that the cash contributed to the plan was the proper
amount to reflect on company books of account.
This general identity of cash contributions and reported expense remained the norm until
the FASB adopted Statement of Financial Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) in December,
1985, and required its application to plan years beginning after December 15, 1986.
SFAS 87 broke the tight bond between plan contributions and expense and significantly
tightened the rules with respect to the selection of actuarial assumptions.  Despite these
improvements, SFAS 87 formalized and endorsed a systemic financial bias embedded in
all pension actuarial methods.  This bias derives from the anticipation of expected equity
returns and the smoothing of equity volatility.
In financial terms, SFAS 87 overstates reported earnings because it reduces current
expense by the expected return on risky assets in advance of the risk.  SFAS 87 also
smoothes earnings by amortizing deviations between expected and actual returns over
forward periods.  The combined effect of anticipating returns and smoothing deviations is
so powerful that the resulting pension income (expense) is entirely uncorrelated with the
contemporaneous market portfolio -- i.e., when we look upon the pension plan as a
portfolio of assets and liabilities, we find that the returns (pension income or expense) on
this portfolio appear to have a CAPM beta of zero no matter the equity allocation.11
If accounting for pension plans followed the financial economics model, the ideas of the
pension finance theorists would find a ready audience.  With a transparent accounting
base, financial writers in the popular media would be able to understand and to explain
the issues that would then cause rational investors to discredit equity investment by
pension plans.
                                               
9 Ibid., Table 2.18.
10 Dreher(1960) and Hamilton, Jackson (1968)
11 Section VI modifies this assertion for longer measurement periods.
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The overstatement of corporate earnings associated with pension plan equity
investments provides an incentive for managers to invest in equities.  It is likely,
however, that the incentive does not have a direct role; nor are managers necessarily
aware of the earnings bias.  Rather it is the case that the bias: 1)  reinforces managers'
beliefs about the benefits of equities for the long run, and 2)  defeats (through opacity)
the rational objections that would cause capital markets to correct the managers'
behavior (and beliefs).  Thus it may be said that the bias does not cause the equity
investments, rather it enables them.  This theory of bias, opacity and enablement
explains observed practitioner behavior.  It continues the integrated financial
management concept but removes the transparency assumption of the earlier theory.
Corporate financial managers are highly motivated to report good earnings.  The
earnings management literature12 shows that persistent earnings are valued highly by
investors and this is an incentive for managers to use their discretion in pursuit of
smoothness.  It is evident that SFAS 87 which overstates and smoothes earnings
derived from pension plan equity investments will, if not penetrated by analysts,
upwardly bias valuations by investors.  The accounting view with respect to the value of
smoothing has a financial counterpart:  ceteris paribus, undetected smoothing of the
returns on a portfolio will generally reduce CAPM beta and upwardly bias valuations by
investors.
Remaining Sections
In Section II we further develop the finance versus accounting issue and its impact on
investors.  We include a thought experiment which shows how anticipating and
smoothing returns biases valuation.  In Section III we specify the assumptions and
develop the corporate structure that drives the model of Section IV.  The model of
Section IV begins by valuing the pension plan subsidiary as a marketed portfolio of
assets and liabilities.  We show how this may be reformulated to produce the SFAS 87
pension expense equation and how the resulting bias is injected.  Section V begins with
a description of transparent accounting and then develops support for my opacity thesis
which asserts that the capital markets neither penetrate the actuarial veil nor correct
                                               
12 See, e.g., Healy and Wahlen (1999)
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managers who invest their pension plans in equity.  Section VI looks at counter
arguments some of which weaken the opaque model and lead to a translucent middle
ground.  Section VII proposes an empirical framework for testing the degree of
translucency and thus the merits of the opacity argument.  Section VIII addresses how
mispricing based on the opaque model can persist.  Section IX concludes.
II Opaque Model Encourages Mispricing
Contrast:  finance and accounting
Finance focuses on the capital markets and the securities that are traded therein.
Because the right-hand side of corporate balance sheets represent items that either are,
or highly resemble, securities, it is natural for finance to model corporations as portfolios.
This view does not translate so well to the left-hand side of corporate balance sheets
where market values are not so evident.  Over time, however, the capital markets have
been able to reconstitute some business assets in more security-like forms (e.g., sale-
leasebacks).  A lease is more amenable to financial analysis than is a factory.  Despite
such activities, it will be quite some time, if ever, before the portfolio view of business
permits any convergence between accounting and finance.
Some entities, however, are inherently more amenable to this portfolio view than are
others.  The most amenable are, not surprisingly, financial entities.  Among the
financials, the most naturally transparent and market-value-able are mutual funds and
similar portfolio pass-throughs such as asset-backed securities, repackaged asset
vehicles and defined contribution pension plans.  Not quite so readily transparent, but
certainly potentially subject to the market value portfolio view are banks, insurance
companies and defined benefit pension plans.
A special problem presented by defined benefit pension plans ever since sponsors left
the insured plan arena and established their own pension subsidiaries has been that
these subsidiaries are financial companies while the parents have often been industrial
operating companies.  The traditional accounting for operating companies expects costs
(including wages and employee benefits) to be stable in relation to product quantities
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and prices.  As discussed in the previous section, actuaries devised ways to impose
these operating company objectives on the accounting for the finance subsidiary.
Accounting:  earnings and balance sheet.  Finance:  returns and value
An observation of accounting is that, in theory, the balance sheet and the income
statement are redundant since each implies the other.13  A similar relationship exists in
finance between portfolio returns and market value.  This redundancy implies that
analysts should be able to deduce the value of a business by review of either the
earnings or the balance sheet.  Given the limitations of theory, however, we are not
surprised to learn that analysts attempt to value businesses through careful review of
both presentations.
For operating companies, this use of both presentations adds to analyst understanding
in part because neither is presented in market value terms.  When, as is often the case,
the analyst infers different values from different sources, s/he will often arrive at a
valuation by a weighted judgmental process.  At different times and in different industries
one source or the other may dominate.
For financial entities, the tangible market value (assets less liabilities each at market
value) may be arrived at relatively easily.14  The market value of the enterprise should
exceed this baseline value due to franchise and option effects.15  For the special case
where the financial entity is a defined benefit pension plan sponsored by an operating
company, the positive franchise and option effects are properly attributed to the parent.
Further, the negative option effects may be managed to a near zero value.
Thus the analysts should give great weight to the disclosed asset and liability values and
virtually no weight to the pension expense.  This would be consistent with existing
pension financial theory.  If corporate managers acted as though they believed that the
analysts would act accordingly, we would expect observed behavior to align with
pension theory.  Analysts would adjust the corporate expense to ignore the pension
component and would value the operating company without regard to the pension plan.
                                               
13 Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1993)
14 For pension plans, these are revealed in the SFAS 87 footnote.
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Finally, the analysts would add the plan’s tangible market value (“surplus” if positive,
“deficit” if negative) to the operating company value.
Accordingly, the managers would invest entirely in fixed income assets (to maximize the
potential tax arbitrage gain for shareholders) and would closely match the duration to the
plan liabilities in order to minimize the value of embedded negative options.
All of this suggests strongly that the pension plan subsidiary is not viewed in the above
fashion by analysts or else that the managers do not know that the analysts are using
tangible market value.  The managers must believe that analysts are giving substantial
weight to the income effects of the pension plan.
In this paper we call the hypothesized behavior of the analysts the “opaque” view
because they seem not to see and appreciate the tangible market value.  We call the
managerial behavior “contagious opacity” because it represents the managers reactions
to the analysts inability to recognize the tangible asset value16.  We also use the term
contagious opacity to describe the potential behavior of the analyst who says to herself “I
see that the appropriate value is the plan surplus (deficit) and I should ignore the
pension income (expense), but my job is to deduce the value that the consensus will
assign and I believe that the consensus assigns substantial weight to pension income."
A thought experiment
Suppose we establish a transparent box and place some publicly traded assets into it.
We offer shares in the box.  Not surprisingly, in an efficient setting, these shares sell at
the net asset value of the assets in the box.  Of course this is an open-end mutual fund
and transparent accounting neither adds nor subtracts value from the assets in the box.
Next, suppose that the box is opaque.  Periodically the box pays out its audited total
return.  Because the assets inside the box constitute a marketed portfolio, with some
assumptions about information efficiency we can conclude that shares in this box will
                                                                                                                                           
15 Babbel (1999).
16 Actually, as discussed in Section V, I believe that they often follow a different discipline which
would be disabled by transparent pension accounting.
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also sell for their net asset value even though the market cannot see what is in the box.
Perfectly accurate and pertinent accounting is a sufficient replacement for transparency.
Next, suppose that the box invests in the S&P 500 index portfolio, can borrow without
limits at the risk-free rate17, and pays out each period the expected return on the S&P
500.  In order to maintain one unit of S&P exposure, the box borrows (lends) the excess
(shortfall) of the paid out expected return relative to the actual return.  The unconditional
expected net borrowing/lending position of the box is zero for any future date.  Because
the box is opaque, the market observes only the payout.
Assuming that the S&P expected return is unvarying, the payout is a constant stream.
Under these assumptions, the market can be expected to value the ownership of the
payout stream as a riskless perpetuity:
Defining:
return of rate riskless  term short r =
 r  
_
q >= equities on return expected 
The market value of the unit of S&P in the box is equal to 1=
_
q/
_
q  and the value of the
payout stream is 1>/r
_
q .  In effect, opacity combined with unlimited zero-expected-
value borrowing adds value.
To apply this experiment to the real world, we have to make a case for analysts who
focus on earnings instead of tangible market values and for managers who respond to
analysts.  The accounting literature18 shows that accounting can fool enough of the
people some of the time.  The FASB has, in concept, endorsed a fully transparent model
but it has been reluctant to apply it immediately.  We must also explain why those
                                               
17 In order to rule out arbitrage opportunities, structures such as this are excluded from modern
asset pricing theory.  In other words, extrapolation from this example leads to impossible
perpetual money machines.
18 Section V.
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analysts who do see through the accounting cannot establish profitable arbitrage
strategies.
We believe that the dissonance between theory and practice calls for an explanation not
provided by the transparent financial models.  Other than for their transparency,
however, we find the arbitrage based arguments of the models compelling.  Whether our
explanation for the lack of reconciliation between theory and practice is valid is subject to
empirical analysis and we outline an appropriate test19.
How pensions compare/contrast with the thought experiment
The purpose of the thought experiment is to highlight the intuition for the more detailed
analysis developed in Sections III and IV.  The complete opacity attributed to the black
box above exaggerates the pension plan case.  The footnotes to the audited financial
statements provide the market values of the pension assets and a good approximation
to the market values of the liabilities deemed to have accrued to date.
Additionally, the rates of liability discount and the expected return on assets are
disclosed so that it is possible for investors to make their own adjustments.  Amir and
Benartzi (1998) find a weak positive connection between the expected return on assets
and the actual asset allocation.  They indicate that enforcement would make the
relationship stronger and result in a fair presentation.  Neither they nor the other relevant
accounting literature question the systematic bias implied by the use of an expected
return that includes an equity risk premium.
The black box does not allow for additions to assets and future payouts.  Pension plans
typically award new benefits and pay out old benefits each year and often receive new
contributions from the plan sponsor.  The model below takes account of these matters.
Pension plan demographics affect the real world as well.  In our model below we
assume that these are perfectly predictable.  In this regard, we follow the precedents of
the existing pension finance literature.  Further in this tradition, we assume that the plan
liabilities are bond-like and may be modeled as such.
                                               
19 Section VII.
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III Model Approach
We contrast the financial (transparent) model of defined benefit pension plans and the
actuarial (opaque).  The transparent view implies that almost every plan should be
invested entirely in fixed income securities; the opaque model encourages equity
investments.  With the opaque model, good things happen to managers who invest in
equities.  Under the transparent model, bad things would happen.
Assumptions
The models are based on the following assumptions:
A.1 The plan holds, as assets, a portfolio of marketed securities.
A.2 Plan liabilities are fixed cash flows without demographic uncertainty.
A.3 a) Transparency: the market values of pension plans accurately reflect the
market value of assets and liabilities.
b) Opacity: the market values of pension plans are derived entirely from
reported expenses (income).
A.4 The combination of collateral (plan assets), federal insurance and regulation, and
very low probabilities of sponsor bankruptcy allow us to discount liabilities at or
near riskless rates.20
A.3a defines the financial view of pension plans.  A.3b defines the actuarial view.
Definitions
Consider a pension plan (subscript P) as a financial subsidiary (an annuity company) of
an operating (subscript B) company.  Let:
  A tP =,  plan assets at time t.
  L tP =,  plan liabilities.
  E tP =,  plan surplus (deficit) tPtP  - L A ,,=
                                               
20 Gold (1989) discusses cases where this assumption is not supportable.
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so that tPE ,  is the transparent value of the intermediary (tangible market value).
  A tB =,  operating assets, valued at market.
21
  L tB =,  operating liabilities, valued at market.
  E tB =,  operating company equity tBtB  - L A ,,=
For the capital markets, let:
  =r  the one-period near riskless return.
  
_
=r  the near riskless periodic rate of return on the liabilities over their term (internal rate
of return).
  
~
=r  the one-period stochastic total return on the liabilities.
=
~
q  the one-period stochastic rate of return on equity investment.
=
_
q  the expected long-term rate of return on equity investment.
=a  the fraction of assets invested in indexed equities, balance at the short term rate.
=-+= )r(
~
q
~
e aa 1  one-period stochastic rate of return on an -a weighted portfolio.
=-+= r(qe
__
)1 aa  long-term expected periodic rate of return on an -a weighted
portfolio.
  =tMRV  market related value of assets which is often a trailing average of market
values; a smoothed version of tPA , .
 =tC  cash contribution from the operating company to the plan at end of period.
 =tiB ,  benefit for participant i  attributed to service up to time t .
 =tiPVDA ,  present value at time t  of a deferred annuity on behalf of participant i .
                                               
21 Babbel (1999) identifies a franchise value and a default put value to the asset side of
insurance company balance sheets.  To the extent that these items apply to our entities, we
ascribe them to the operating company.
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i
=-=D å - tititit PVDABBPVB ,1,, )(  new liability attributable to the period ],1[ tt - .
 =tP  pension benefits paid to participants at end of period.
  AMTt =  the one-period amortization of historic deviations between actual and
assumed plan experience designed to drive tPE ,  to zero over time.
IV Pension Subsidiary Model
Structure
Attach the pension plan subsidiary to the operating company following the augmented
balance sheet concept introduced by Jack Treynor (Bagehot, 1972 and Treynor, Regan
and Priest, 1978).  The following is based on Figure 1 in the 1978 article:
Augmented Balance Sheet
(at market value)
Assets Liabilities
=tPA ,  Pension portfolio =tPL ,  Present value of pensions
=tBA ,  Corporate assets =tBL ,  Corporate liabilities
=+= tBtPt EEE ,,  Corporate equity
Thus the composite corporate entity is valued at (market capitalization):
tPtPtBtBt LALAE ,,,, -+-=
We redesign this balance sheet along the lines of Mazzilli (1988):
Consolidated Balance Sheet
(at market value)
Assets Liabilities
=tPE ,  Annuity company equity
=tBE ,  Operating company equity =+= tBtPt EEE ,,  Corporate equity
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Balance Sheet – Annuity Company
(at market value)
Assets Liabilities
=tPL ,  PV pensions=tPA ,  Pension portfolio
=tPE ,  Annuity co. equity
Balance Sheet - Operating Company
(at market value)
Assets Liabilities
=tBL ,  Corp. liabilities=tBA ,  Corporate assets
=tBE ,  Oper. co. equity
We ask how do the operating and annuity companies interact and which is responsible
for what elements of pension plan operations and costs?
Interactions
As the employees accrue pension benefits, the operating company "buys" the benefits
(market value tPVBD ) from the annuity company which bears the responsibility for
payment.  Periodically, the operating company pays cash contributions ( tC ) to the
annuity subsidiary in accordance with the rules of ERISA and the discretion of the plan's
actuary working in cooperation with corporate management.  The value tPVBtC D-
constitutes an infusion (drainage if negative) of capital into the annuity company by the
operating company.
The accounting for the annuity purchases follows SFAS 87.  As outlined in Appendix A,
SFAS 87 uses the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO) approach to attribute the accrual
of benefits by individual employees to accounting periods.  This means that benefits
purchased in the current period are based on salaries expected to be earned in the
future.  An alternative Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) approach that does not
anticipate future salary increases would be more in keeping with the modern finance
view of pensions.  Because this paper treats the definition of the liabilities as arbitrary (or
at least exogenous), the PBO/ABO distinction is moot.  The annuity company is
understood to be responsible for a given set of liabilities no matter how determined.22
Costs - financial model
Under the financial model, the consolidated marked-to-market cost of the plan is:
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)()( 1,,1,, -- --+--+= tPtttPtPttP
f
t ACPALPLX
Note that benefits paid to participants are redundant because assets and liabilities are
simultaneously and equally reduced.  As shown, a portion of the asset change ( tC ) is
attributable to cash contributions made by the operating company to the annuity
company.  Similarly, part of the liability change ( tPVBD ) flows the same way.
Recognizing that that portion of the total pension plan expense is properly assigned to
the operating company, we separately state the operating company portion and the
annuity company portion of the pension cost:
f
tP
f
tB
f
t XXX ,, += (1a)
t
f
tB PVBX D=, (1b)
)()( 1,,1,,, -- --+--D-+= tPtttPtPtttP
f
tP ACPALPVBPLX (1c)
The change in assets not explained by assets contributed and assets paid out must be
the investment return on the initial assets:
1,
~
1,, -- =--+ tPtPtttP AeACPA
and similarly for liabilities:
1,
~
1,, -- =-D-+ tPtPtttP LrLPVBPL
We restate the annuity company loss (gain), i.e., its share of consolidated plan expense:
1,
~
1,
~
, -- -= tPtP
f
tP AeLrX (2)
                                                                                                                                           
22 For a discussion of the economic relevance of the PBO and ABO, see Bodie (1990).
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We note a special case where the plan is invested in liability-matching bonds, borrowing
(lending) the plan deficit (surplus) at the short rate:
1,1,
~
1,1,
~
1,1,1,
~
1,
~
, )()()( -------- -=-+-=---= tPtPtPtPtPtPtPtP
f
tP rEErrALrrEEArLrX
Costs - actuarial/accounting model
We want to show how the actuarial/accounting model differs from the financial model
with attention paid to: 1) anticipation of returns to risk, and 2) smoothing to obscure the
risk.  In a sense these are two sides of the same coin and, assuming opacity, either side
can appear to add value that does not exist in the transparent financial model.  We will
present the case wherein the value arises from the anticipation of returns to risk and
where smoothing provides the mechanism necessary to facilitate the anticipation.  An
equal presentation might be made wherein the value arises from the smoothing implying
that anticipation is the facilitating mechanism.
The value that appears to be induced by the opaque model arises in the context of a
market with diversified investors with an equity risk premium attributable to the bearing
of systemic (non-diversifiable) risk.  This implies that fluctuations (zero-mean) in the
expense (income) streams of the financial subsidiary that are orthogonal (zero-beta) to
the market portfolio neither create nor destroy value.  Elements in the expense (income)
stream that do correlate with the market portfolio need to be discounted on a risk-
adjusted basis in order to measure present value.
With this in mind, we will rework the transparent cost equation by piecemeal substitution
(identifying where the opaque model seems to add value) until we arrive at the opaque
model of pension expense known as SFAS 87.
Assuming diversified investors and an equity risk premium strictly attributable to
systemic risk implies that the certainty equivalent of all stochastic income variables is
r .23  Thus the ex-ante market value of f tPX ,  is unchanged when we write (2) as
24:
                                               
23 This result may also be illustrated by hedging.
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1,1,1,, --- -=-= tptPtP
f
tP rErArLX (3)
which may be understood to mean that the risk-adjusted expense (income) of the
pension subsidiary is identical to the short rate applied to the plan deficit (surplus)
regardless of the asset allocation or liability duration as long as all of the assets and
liabilities are defined in complete markets.
We revise the subsidiary expense using expected rather than risk-adjusted return:
1,
_
1,
_
, -- -= tPtP
a
tP AeLrX
where the new superscript indicates an actuarial rather than a financial value.  This new
expense is the pith of the opaque model.  Below, we make some zero-mean zero-beta
adjustments.  These adjustments camouflage the process and allow it to achieve an
accounting balance but no financial value is added or subtracted from this point onward.
We note that the changes in the market values of tPL ,  and tPA ,  over the period ],1[ tt -
are always reconciled by the annuity company transparent expense, f tPX , , but that this
is not the case when the expense is defined by a tPX , .  These deviations are expected to
average out to zero over time but, just to make sure that the accounting trues up over a
defendable time frame (e.g., fifteen years), we (acting now as accountants) will identify
the differences between the ex-post values of f tPX ,  and 
a
tPX ,  that have accumulated
over prior periods.  Further, since the annuity company serves only the pension process,
the accounting must also drive tPE ,
25 to zero over time.
                                                                                                                                           
24 (2) is the certainty equivalent of (1).  For the remainder of this section, we adopt the
convention of using the same notation on the left-hand side of equations for all members of a
certainty equivalence set.
25 Adjusted for balance sheet accruals.
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The corrections to the forward accounting expense necessary to true up prior deviations
and to eliminate the plan deficit (surplus) take the form of amortizations of these
amounts over n subsequent periods.26  This assures an asymptotic accounting balance
at a horizon that is regularly extended.27  Thus:
1,
_
1,
_
, -- -+= tPttP
a
tP AeAMTLrX (4)
This representation produces a time series for a tPX ,  with reduced volatility in comparison
to the f tPX ,  time series and with ultimately equal accounting value.
The actuarial methodology that was adapted in the process of developing SFAS 87 had
been designed to provide a budgeting process for contribution flows from the operating
to the annuity company.  Smooth cash flows were a high priority of this design.
During the development of SFAS 87, many actuaries argued that (4) was too volatile.28
The historical actuarial approach smoothed the asset value before applying a rate of
return.29  Thus the formula was adjusted to smooth it further:
1
_
1,
_
, -- -+= tttP
a
tP MRVeAMTLrX
The differences between 1-tMRV  and 1, -tPA  are also accumulated and their
amortization becomes part of tAMT .
30
                                               
26 n is a number defined as a weighted average of values each of which is usually in the range
of [5,15] years.  The average amortization period depends on the plan's historical path.
27 The value of n is adjusted each year to reflect emerging deviations.  Thus, for an ongoing
plan, n does not  systematically shrink and the smoothing process is perpetuated.  Upon plan
termination, n disappears so that all the accumulated deviations are accounted for at once.
28 Buck Consultants (1985) for example.
29 Hamilton, Jackson (1968)
30 Additionally, a corridor equal to 10% of the larger of 1-tMRV  and 1, -tPL  is defined such that
01 º-tAMT  unless the absolute value of the accumulated deviations is greater than the
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Next some cosmetic (notational) changes need to be made:31
11, -- -+= ttt
a
tP jMRVAMTiPBOX
Finally we bring tPVBD  (renamed tSC ) back into the equation to reflect
operating/annuity company consolidation:
11 -- -++= tttt
a
t jMRVAMTSCiPBOX
which is the SFAS 87 formula as shown in Appendix A.
Costs - actuarial/accounting bias
We now consider the difference between a tPX ,  and 
f
tPX ,  to see whether these may be
described as zero-mean zero-beta and thus without financial bias.
The difference 1,
_
1,
_
,,, )()( -- ---=-=D tPtP
f
tP
a
tPtP AreLrrXXX .  Since none of the terms are
stochastic in their relation to the market portfolio in the period ],1[ tt - , the difference
may be described as zero-beta.
But the difference is not zero-mean.  The accounting equation overstates the expense to
the extent that 0)( ,
_
>- tPLrr  and it understates the expense to the extent that
0)( ,
_
>- tPAre .  The overstatement represents the difference that one usually expects to
find between the internal rate of return on a liability-matching portfolio of bonds and the
short rate.  For the most part this overcharge is an artifact of SFAS 87 that cannot be
                                                                                                                                           
corridor amount.  The purpose of the corridor is further to smooth expense by allowing
relatively small amortizations of opposite sign to cancel out before recognition.
31
_
ri º ; 
_
ej º ; 1-tPBO  is a particular instance of the more general 1, -tPL .  It specifies that
future salary increases are embedded in benefits attributed to the current period.
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directly altered by the plan manager32.  It can, however, be neutralized on the asset side
of the equation by adding liability-matching bonds to the assets of the plan while
borrowing their cost.33
The understatement of the plan expense equal to tPAre ,
_
)( -  is generally under the
direct control of the plan manager in two ways: first, by using accounting discretion with
respect to selecting 
_
e  as discussed by Amir and Benartzi (1998); second by choosing
the equity exposure percentage a .  The first represents a misapplication or lax
enforcement of SFAS 87.  The second is more significant because it represents a
conceptual error in the financial framework that underlies SFAS 87.
The FASB has been moving towards a "fair value" approach that is likely, in the long run,
to undo the bias in SFAS 87.  It has developed a concept statement Exposure Draft
(FASB No. 204-B, March 31, 1999) showing how "fair value" concepts may be employed
to shift the accounting paradigm from valuation by history to valuation by arbitrage.  It
has also issued Preliminary Views (FASB No. 195-A, December 14, 1999) on the
application of fair value to financial instruments and certain related assets and liabilities
of corporations.  Section V expands on these developments at the FASB.
Value of the cost bias
After hedging the overstatement of the expense due to liabilities34, the understated
expense remains:
tPtP ArqAre ,
_
,
_
)()( -=- a
In perpetuity, the value of this bias equals:
                                               
32 The rate r  is given by the market and the use of the rate 
_
r  is defined in SFAS 87 and
backed by a powerful enforcement letter from the SEC (Schuetze, 1993).
33 Various ways of implementing this hedge are discussed by Gold and Peskin (1988).
34 The liability hedge (previous footnote) corrects the accounting bias, adds to earnings and
reduces plan asset-liability risk.  A corresponding asset hedge would eliminate equity
investment and end the conflict between theory and practice that is the heart of this paper.
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)1()( -=
-
aa
The partial derivatives with respect to a  of the annual and perpetuity values are,
respectively:
tPArq ,
_
)( -
1,
_
)1( -- tPAr
q
If, for example, we take %6%,12
_
== rq  , then a $1 shift of pension plan assets from cash
to equity results in an earnings bias with a potential (fully opaque) perpetuity value of $1
(pre-tax).  After corporate tax at an assumed 35% rate, market capitalization may be
increased by $.65 for each dollar shifted.  Alternatively, if we assume an after-tax
price/earnings ratio of 30:1, market capitalization is inflated by $1.17
%)]351(30%)6%12(1[$ --  for each $1 shifted.
V Supporting Considerations
In this section I briefly outline a transparent accounting method.  We then review some
of the explanations that practitioners offer for their investments in equities.  We argue
that these explanations are not sufficiently rebuked under opaque accounting but that we
may reasonably believe that managers would alter their behavior if transparent
accounting were the norm.
We then look at the earnings management literature and learn that earnings are value-
relevant for investors, that investors are often misled by managers who use accounting
discretion to smooth and otherwise dress up earnings, and that accounting research is
silent on the systemic bias in pension accounting.
Jeremy Gold Biased Methodology Enables Equity Investment May 30, 2000
by Defined Benefit Pension Plans
24
Lastly we look at FASB activity and see some progress towards transparent accounting.
The FASB is seriously considering the use of fair value accounting for financial
instruments.  At the moment, their proposal in this area explicitly excludes SFAS 87.  If
SFAS 87 were included we might well expect the financial press to follow the arguments
of pension finance theory.  This in turn would lead to persuasive arguments against
pension plan equity investments that would be understandable and communicable
among analysts, investors, financial planners and consultants.
Transparent accounting
Transparent accounting for a pension plan would follow the approach shown in equation
(1) of Section IV.
Equation (1b), what SFAS 87 calls the service cost, is the fair value of benefits
attributed to the current accounting period.  It would be reported on the operating
company's books as a component of employee compensation expense.  Because it is a
long duration discount variable, in a traditional defined benefit plan, it will be volatile with
respect to interest rate changes.  It will generally amount to a single-digit percentage of
compensation and in the face of significant changes in long-term interest rates it might
go up or down by as much as two percent of compensation from year to year.
If the corporation sponsored a cash balance plan and if the benefit attributed to the
period for any employee equaled that year's compensation credit35, then there would not
be interest rate volatility.
Equation (1c), restated as equation (2), represents the change in tangible market value
for the pension subsidiary or annuity company.  Except when the probability of
bankruptcy or asset reversion is not trivial, the market value of the company should
reflect this change with a multiplier identical to one36.  In order to facilitate this valuation,
the market value of assets and liabilities should be presented in a pension balance
sheet.  The change in the tangible market value (annuity company net income) should
                                               
35 I.e., if an ABO approach to pension liabilities were employed.  This approach is particularly
appropriate in the cash balance case.
36 After accounting for taxes.
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be treated as "non-operating income" flowing into shareholders equity37 without
appearing in the operating P&L statement.38
Presented with pension plan information in this fashion, it is likely that analysts and
investors would reach many of the same conclusions as do the financial researchers
discussed in Section I.
Opacity enables fables – practictioners' tales
The opacity theory offered in this paper is a theory of enablement not of causation.
What this means is that, absent opacity, the transparent financial theories would in all
likelihood prevail over the common practices of the day.  In this subsection we sketch
the rationales commonly offered by corporate financial officers with pension plan
responsibilities as well as by the actuaries and consultants who advise them.
What do pension plan managers tell themselves and their associates and constituents
they are doing?  Many would explain that they are maximizing long-term expected
returns while tolerating acceptable levels of risk.  When they invoke the long-term nature
of the process, they are really making several possible arguments:
· In the long run equities are not as risky as they appear to be in the short run.  This
view is a proxy for a strong mean-reverting model or a shortfall model or for similar
ideas that inhabit the actuarial (and popular) psyche.39  This view ignores arbitrage
based arguments and generally supports perpetual money machines that may
usually be reduced to "borrow at the risk-free rate and invest in equities and pay for
liabilities with the profits".
· Even though equities are risky in the short run, the actuarial process is self-
correcting and does not get far off course when market setbacks occur.  The short-
                                               
37 Deferred  taxes on this income (expense) should be taken into account.
38 The non-operating income approach is suggested by Knutson (1999).
39 Burrows (1999) says: "Any market downswing experienced in one generation will be offset by
an upswing in later generations.”  Mr. Burrows has headed the Actuarial Standards Board
and its project that led to Actuarial Standard of Practice 27 (ASOP 27).  Key elements of
ASOP 27 are outlined in Appendix D.  ASOP 27 continues and formalizes the decades old
actuarial practice of using the expected rate of return on plan assets to discount liabilities.
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term effects on plan assets are troubling but the impact is deferred and we usually
catch up sooner or later.  This is a combination of the long-term argument above and
a reliance on the enabling actuarial technology.  This combination can be no stronger
than the long-term argument alone.
· Our real risk is underperforming our competitors and facing higher effective labor
costs because we have not earned the equity premium.  We can better tolerate the
equity risk than we can the competitive risk.
If this were true and the enabling camouflage were not in place, then it could easily
be countered by the Black argument: if your shareholders cannot figure out how to
adjust your exposure to the equity market versus that of your competitors (i.e., they
do not follow Tepper), then take the equity risk on your taxable balance sheet.  In this
instance it should be clear that such an exposure will not be camouflaged.
· We take the ERISA fiduciary responsibility seriously40.  We understand that its
version of the Prudent Man Rule tells us to diversify across asset classes as well as
across individual securities.  This is a misinterpretation of the rule.  It is clear that a
liability-matching bond portfolio meets ERISA fiduciary responsibilities as may many
other all-fixed-income strategies.
· We do stochastic studies of our assets and liabilities41.  These studies show us how
assets, liabilities, expenses and various other measurement and control variables
are likely to evolve over various time periods from five to thirty years.  When we look
at the results it is clear that equity exposure in the long run presents virtually no risk
and that over shorter periods, we can live with the risks associated with our level of
equity investment.  As earlier, this is a combination of the long-term argument and a
reliance on the enabling actuarial technology.
· Our pension plan is a profit center.  We raise capital by promising benefits that an
insurance company could provide.  By running our own insurance company and
investing in equities we profit.  In a world where the annuity market is competitive,
                                               
40 McGill et al (1996) page 650 and following discuss ERISA diversification.
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shareholders of an operating business earn no special rewards for adding an annuity
business to the product mix.  The equity argument is the same perpetual money
argument presented once again.
Transparency disables fables
Consider the senior manager who asks the company's auditors and actuaries what effect
on earnings would occur if the plan were to reduce its policy42 exposure to equities.  If
the change in asset allocation were very large, it is almost certain that the manager
would be told that the immediate effect would be a decrease in current earnings followed
by lower expected earnings ever after.  For a less substantial change in allocation (e.g.,
a reduction in equity exposure from 60% to 50%), the manager would probably be told
that the current earnings can be protected43 but that future earnings will very likely be
reduced.  When investor and analyst reactions to earnings are factored in, most
managers are likely to continue the long term equity position of the plan even if they
elect to reduce it tactically.
Now tell the senior manager that although equity returns are generally higher than those
on fixed income, some of the rewards are likely to be shared by employees or tax-
collectors.  But the reported earnings will continue to be higher with equities and only
very good equity returns will result in sharing with these other parties.  The manager is
still likely to conclude that this is a good arrangement.
Now explain the Tepper44 arbitrage argument to the manager.  With lower equity
exposure in the pension plan, taxable shareholders will be able to hold more equity in
their personal portfolios and this is more tax-effective for them.  The perceptive manager
may ask whether the shareholder will be able to earn higher after-tax returns on a
                                                                                                                                           
41 McGill et al (1996) discusses such studies briefly beginning at page 574.
42 The expected long-term return on assets under SFAS 87 depends on the policy asset
allocation which is determined infrequently.  Interim (non-policy) allocations may vary due to
market forces and tactical decisions.
43 The expected long-term rate of return on plan assets (what we have defined as j) should be
adjusted in accordance any changes in asset allocation policy or when the market
environment for future returns changes.  Actuaries have generally understood the phrase
"expected long-term" to suggest that j should rarely be changed.
44 Unlike the Black version which has structural impediments and requires capitalization
changes by the corporation, the Tepper arbitrage depends only on shareholder perception
and revaluation.
Jeremy Gold Biased Methodology Enables Equity Investment May 30, 2000
by Defined Benefit Pension Plans
28
portfolio with identical volatility, because if that is true it seems to be a pretty good idea.
Under today's accounting rules, however, the probable answer to that question is "no"
because the volatility of the pension portfolio is being smoothed and the company stock
is not trading as it would under the transparency assumption (i.e., like an operating
company attached to a tax-sheltered mutual fund).
Now reconsider all three of the previous paragraphs in a world where the accounting
procedure is transparent.  The pension plan expense is based entirely on the new
benefits accumulated by employees during the accounting period and the company
maintains a tax-sheltered mutual fund whose asset and liability values are reported
independently at market.  Now the Wall Street Journal writes articles analyzing the
company and the pension plan separately;  The Journal and other business publications
write articles explaining that investors should consider tax effects and volatility.
With such clean accounting, the articles would be easily written and understood.  Now
the senior manager will be told that earnings subject to a price-earnings multiple will not
be affected when the equity exposure is changed.  The manager, a shareholder as well,
will understand that the pension plan is just one of the mutual funds s/he owns and that it
is special because it is tax-favored.  Additionally, explain the employee call and the
excise tax call and how their effects are accentuated by equity exposure and the
manager should shortly conclude that equities are a poor pension investment choice.
Notice that if SFAS 87 were minimally amended to remove the bias that arises from the
use of 
_
e  by requiring r  and then smoothing re-
~
, we would still probably not have a
clear basis upon which to articulate the Tepper-Black arbitrage in a persuasive fashion.
Accounting literature
The accounting literature is silent with respect to the bias discussed herein.  The
literature is not silent with respect to pension plans, nor with respect to accounting, nor
with respect to bias.45  One article (Craig, 1999) very aptly observes that "Noise tends to
                                               
45 A search of ABI/Inform reveals 19435 articles with "pension" in the title or abstract, 43494
with the word "accounting" and 1077 with both.  There are 5041 articles with "bias" in the title
or abstract.  There are 0 articles at the intersection of these terms.  There are 49 with
Jeremy Gold Biased Methodology Enables Equity Investment May 30, 2000
by Defined Benefit Pension Plans
29
cancel out, bias does not."  But he then tells us that "Noise is a statistical term referring
to effects of random errors, which have a cumulative expected value of zero.  Bias does
not have an expected value of zero … "  This view is representative of the accounting
literature in general.  The earnings management literature diligently pursues evidence of
accruals that are intentionally away from the mean.
Let us be clear as to exactly what the nature of my bias claim is.  I contend that the
substitution of 
_
e  for 
~
e  is financially biased.  The earnings management literature is
presumptive with respect to the view that the deliberate misestimate of 
_
e  is biased46 but
that a correct estimate of 
_
e  precludes bias.
SFAS 87 credits 
_
e  as the expected return on assets in each accounting period and
defers (for amortization, i.e., forward averaging) the difference:
_~
ee-
If this difference were orthogonal to the market portfolio, we could invoke the Law of
Large Numbers and agree that, on average, its value is indistinguishable from zero.  But
we (from a finance perspective) know that this is not the case.  Actuarial and accounting
theory, to date, appear to be insensitive to the difference.  The entire pension accounting
literature appears to take the actuarial view to the effect that there is not an economically
important difference between the long-term average and the path that gets one there.
Stated in traditional actuarial terms: if a variable is symmetrically distributed, the use of
the mean is unbiased.
                                                                                                                                           
"pension" and "bias" but they refer to biases in the awarding of pensions not in the
accounting.  There are 206 with accounting and bias but these are focused primarily on
earnings management.
46 Amir and Benartzi (1998), e.g.
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Earlier we invoked the financial equivalence between 
~
e  and r .  If SFAS 87 were to
credit 
~
e , we would be on the way to transparent financial accounting.  If SFAS 87 were
to credit r  and defer and amortize the difference:
re-
~
we would not have full transparency but we would have a financially unbiased estimate.
The disagreement may be stated simply:  financially we identify a symmetry of valuation
around the risk-free rate; in accounting and actuarial science we identify a symmetry
around the expected return.  As before, the key distinction is the power of arbitrage
arguments in financial debate.
In an article written for actuaries interested in investment, Wendt (1999) explains an
article by Bodie (1995) on the persistence of equity risk.  Wendt shows that actuarial
principles break down when the Law of Large Numbers is inapplicable or misapplied.
No amount of forward averaging, and only excessively strong assumptions of mean-
reversion, can remove the financial bias that derives from the use of actuarial principles
that average equity performance over time.  Bodie and Wendt each use the price of
insuring against equity underperformance as the arena to demonstrate the
inappropriateness of trying to wring more than is possible from time diversification.  The
financial economics literature in this regard is traced by Bodie to Samuelson's (1963)
simple but shockingly subtle paper.
How does this defense of the validity of the financial bias inherent in SFAS 87 support
my claim with respect to the behavior of the equity analyst?  In one sense the
implications are clear.  If the accounting and actuarial literature have missed the bias,
why should we expect the analysts to unearth it?
Interestingly, this is too facile a leap.  In fact, some analysts have an appreciation for the
difficulty that is not directly reflected in the earnings management literature.  Stone, Joy
and Thomas (1995) report a survey of Certified Financial Analysts (CFA) who strongly
support an accounting that is very close to what I have herein described as transparent.
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21% of 350 random CFA designated analysts responded to the survey.  A majority of the
respondents favored an accounting system that would place the ABO and the fair value
of plan assets on the balance sheet and for an income equation that is much the
equivalent of our equation (1).
So, if the analysts are keen on this issue, is the opacity claim without merit?  That too
might be too facile a leap.  First, we would have to believe that the majority of the 21% of
the random sample of analysts includes the marginal or consensus analyst.  Second,
that the consensus analyst is presently adjusting both the balance sheet and the income
statement, ignoring the reported pension earnings and not assigning a multiple other
than one to the growth of pension surplus.  Third, that s/he is immune to contagion
and/or concludes that s/he represents the consensus view.  Finally, we must believe that
the corporate managers who make the asset allocation decisions for the pension plan
are persuaded of this and that they are not themselves subject to contagious opacity.
Earnings-management literature shows investors act on reported earnings
The earnings management literature makes it clear that accounting earnings are an
important part of the valuation performed by financial analysts and investors.  In the
language of the literature, earnings are "value-relevant."  The literature also indicates
that corporate managers believe that they can use accounting discretion to mislead their
audiences over the short run.
We are not interested in earnings management per se since it may be defined (Healy
and Wahlen, 1999) as manager use of "judgment in financial reporting and in structuring
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead …"  We are interested to learn
that such efforts succeed, or that managers believe them to succeed, because investors
place great emphasis on reported earnings.  The authors note that "investors appear to
view earnings as more informative than cash flow data."
Other researchers echo this last point often noting, however, that large abnormal
accruals (accruals are defined as the algebraic excess of net income over cash flows)
are often followed by inferior subsequent results and that negative abnormal accruals
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predict future positive results.  This suggests investors follow earnings and are surprised
when successful earnings management (over- or under-accrual) leads to reversals.
For our purposes we take two lessons from the earnings management literature.  First,
that investors and analysts make valuations that are highly dependent on reported
earnings and, second, they are frequently unable to penetrate to the underlying
economic realities.
We also note that the literature that addresses pension accounting makes no
observations with respect to the systematic bias issue that we have raised here.  This
might indicate that all of the researchers are so aware of the bias implications of the
smoothing process that they see no need to opine upon it.  But Amir and Benartzi (1998)
address the relationship between equity allocation and the expected long-term return on
assets (i.e., a  and )(
_
rqre -=- a
_
) without asking whether the use of any risk premium is
appropriate.  From the perspective of their paper, the issue is the difference between
re-
_
 and )(
_
rq-a  rather than the systemic difference between 
_
e  and r  or the financially
equivalent difference between 
_
e  and 
~
e .
Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman (1999) and Barth, Cram and Nelson (1999) find that
earnings (cash flow from operations plus accruals) is a better indicator of future
earnings, cash flows and dividends than are cash flows alone.  In other words accruals
are value-relevant.  But the sign of the coefficients on accruals are found to be negative
while the signs on cash flows are consistently positive.
Chambers (1999) asks:
… whether investors misallocate invested capital away from firms that
practice income-decreasing opportunistic earnings management and
towards firms that practice income-increasing earnings management.
Accounting earnings are an important source of value-relevant
information useful to investors' decisions about the composition of their
investment portfolios.
Jeremy Gold Biased Methodology Enables Equity Investment May 30, 2000
by Defined Benefit Pension Plans
33
Chambers concludes:
Using a broad sample of NYSE, ASE and NASDAQ firms, I find
significant positive abnormal returns from a hedge portfolio formed using
an earnings-management trading rule. … I demonstrate that these
abnormal trading returns are most likely not the result of uncontrolled
differential risk, but rather caused by market mis-pricing.
The FASB process –yesterday, today and tomorrow
Appendix A outlines the SFAS 87 pension expense equation.  In that exercise and in its
more recent activities (discussed below), the FASB may be seen to back away from
transparency, generally in response to the concerns of statement preparers (corporate
financial managers) and not in response to the preferences of equity analysts as
reported by Stone, Joy and Thomas (1995).
SFAS 87 was developed during the 1980's out of the Projected Unit Credit (PUC)
Actuarial Cost Method (ACM), one of several ACM's used by actuaries.  Each of the
ACM's had been designed to control a cash contribution budgeting process with almost
no concern for accounting implications.  The powerful smoothing techniques embedded
in the ACM's made them natural favorites among statement preparers for use in
accounting as well.  The SFAS 87 predecessor, APB 8, permitted the use of many
ACM's and generally equated cash contributions and expense.
SFAS 87 contains discussions about the process leading up to its adoption.  Paragraph
116 tells of the debate with respect to the location (basic financial statements or
footnotes) of the pension information.  This amounts to a distinction between recognition
and disclosure.  The Board concluded:
116. … Further, although the "equal usefulness" argument may be valid
for some sophisticated users, the Board does not believe it holds for all or
even most other users.  Finally, if the argument were valid, the
consequences of recognition would not be different from those of not
recognizing but disclosing the same information; it is obvious from their
arguments that many who assert that disclosure would be equally
useful believe that recognition would have different consequences.
[emphasis added]
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Note that, even after this observation, pension expense is recognized under SFAS 87
but pension assets and liabilities are merely disclosed in the footnotes.47
The lesson that we may take from this is that the presentation of information can be as
or more important than its content.  The fashion of today is to value companies more by
multiples of earnings than by pension assets and liabilities that do not even make it out
of the footnote and onto the balance sheet.  Is it not reasonable to conclude that
managers believe that their investors will be pleased by large equity exposure ( a ) and
high expected returns (
_
e )?
In paragraphs 120 and 121, we learn that the Board acquiesced to understatement of
the volatility inherent in the transparent accounting model:
120.  The Board understands that measuring investments at fair value
could introduce volatility into the financial statements as a result of short-
term changes in fair values.48  Some respondents described that volatility
as meaningless or even misleading, particularly in view of the long-run
nature of the pension commitment and the fact that pension investments
are often held for long periods, thus providing opportunity for some gains
or losses to reverse.49 …
121.  The Board concluded that the difference between the actual return
on assets and the expected return on assets50 could be recognized in net
periodic pension cost on a delayed basis. … That conclusion was based
on (a) the probability that at least some gains would be offset by
subsequent losses and vice versa and (b) respondents' arguments that
immediate recognition would produce unacceptable volatility and would
be inconsistent with the present accounting model.  [emphasis added]
Note the phrase "the present accounting model."  This is the model based on historic
cost values.  Currently an effort is underway at the FASB to supplant this accounting
concept with the "fair value" concept discussed below.
                                               
47 When the plan assets fall below the ABO, the difference is promoted to the liability side of the
corporate balance sheet, but this is an unusual state.
48 This is consistent with our earlier observation that accounting rules applicable to an operating
company are at odds with a  transparent view of a financial subsidiary.
49 This argument is similar to that made by Burrows (1999) and at odds with Samuelson (1963).
50
_~
ee-
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Volatility and delayed recognition of gains and losses are further discussed beginning at
paragraph 173.  In paragraph 178, we learn that:
178.  The Exposure Draft [preceding the final version of SFAS] would
have required use of the discount rate and the fair value of assets [i.e.,
1,
_
-tPAr  instead of 1
_
-tMRVe ] as the basis for calculating the return-on-
assets component of net periodic pension cost.  Many respondents
argued that the return-on-assets component so determined would create
unacceptable volatility even if gains and losses were never amortized.
The Board considered several approaches that would have further
reduced volatility and concluded that the approach required by this
Statement represents the best pragmatic solution.
Note that the basis in the Exposure Draft is very close to unbiased (the net bias after
considering both assets and liabilities is 1,
_
)( -- tPErr  which is very small in comparison
to the bias in the final Statement.
Note the resistance expressed to acknowledgement of the volatility inherent in equity
investments.  It is clear that many of respondents (most of whom were likely to be
aligned with the preparers rather than the users of financial statements) perceived equity
as a favored long-term investment (ignoring all arbitrage based indifference arguments)
and volatility as an enemy.  By prevailing, the respondents immunized themselves and
their constituents against the theories of the financial economists.
Next we consider FASB's latest efforts.  On March 31, 1999, FASB issued a revised
Exposure Draft for a Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC)
Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements.  On
December 14, 1999, FASB issued Preliminary Views on Major Issues Related to
Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value.
Preliminary Views are a precursor to an Exposure Draft which in turn precedes an
SFAS.
The Exposure Draft tells us that fair value is the objective for measuring the present
value of future cash flows.  Fair value is the market value where available and a
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reasoned estimate thereof when it is not.  Paragraph 25 directly rebuts the approach
adopted by actuaries in ASOP 27:
25.  While the expectations of an entity's management are often useful
and informative, the marketplace is the final arbiter of asset and liability
values.  Fair value represents a price and, as such, provides an
unambiguous objective for the development of the cash flows and interest
rates used in present value measurement.  In contrast, the alternative
measurements all accept an element of arbitrariness in the selection of an
interest rate.  For example, some might argue that an asset-earning
rate is appropriate for cost-accumulation measurement of liabilities.
… an entity must pay the market's price when it acquires an asset or
settles a liability in a current transaction, regardless of its intentions or
expectations.  For measurements at initial recognition or fresh-start
measurements, fair value provides the most complete and
representationally faithful measurement of the economic characteristics of
an asset or a liability.  [emphasis added].
But the Exposure Draft does not tell us where and when fair value measurement is
required.  Paragraph 13:
13.  The Board also decided that this Statement will not specify when
fresh-start measurements are appropriate.  Accountants frequently face
situations in which a change in an asset or liability can be recognized by
either a fresh-start measurement or an adjustment to the existing
amortization convention.  The events and circumstances that prompt a
fresh-start measurement vary from one situation to the next, and
information about estimated future cash flows is sometimes part of the
remeasurement determination.  The Board expects to decide whether a
particular situation requires a fresh-start measurement or some other
accounting response on a project-by-project basis.
The Preliminary Views are a specific application of the Exposure Draft to a class of
assets and liabilities that either are or bear a close relationship to financial instruments.
If the Preliminary Views were to be adopted, assets and liabilities that have financial
instrument properties would be carried at fair value.  A fresh-start value would be
measured with each financial statement and would not bear an amortizable relationship
to any previous instances of the item in question.  Additionally, the changes in fair value
from one period to the next would be reported immediately in net income (paragraph 8c).
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Because most assets and liabilities already enter the books of account at fair value when
their recognition stems from a transaction, the challenging issue for the FASB is the
fresh-start remeasurement for financial instruments.  Interestingly, the pension and other
post-retirement benefits are already subject to annual remeasurement.  But, according to
paragraphs 37 and 41 of the Preliminary Views, they will be excepted:
37.  Certain financial instruments are excluded from the scope of this
Preliminary Views, including: …
e.  Employers' and plans' obligations for pension benefits …
41.  Employers' and plans' obligations for pension benefits … are
excluded for practical reasons.  Some of these obligations can be
especially complex, and accounting literature already requires periodic
remeasurement of those obligations (albeit not at fair value).
VI Counter Arguments
The opaque model argues that managers enjoy expected equity returns without the
attendant risk because investors and analysts do not see through the reported earnings.
In this section we review three challenges to this assertion: 1) managers do not take full
advantage of the opportunity to front load equity returns, 2) analysts have the means to
see through the accounting, and 3) the accounting does not entirely obscure equity risk.
SFAS 87 expected returns on assets do not fully adjust for equity premia
Amir and Benartzi (1998) find that the relationship between equity allocation and
expected return on plan assets is weak.  They analyze the extreme deciles and deduce
that the implied equity risk premium is only 67 bp.  In other words, the slope of 
_
e  as a
function of a  is only .67% despite typical empirical estimates of )(
_
rq-  in the range of
5% to 6%.  This finding indicates that the earnings advantage that derives from using the
expected return on equities is not being taken immediately.  Managers who invest in
equity and conservatively estimate 
_
e  expect AMT  to have a negative (favorable) rather
than zero mean.  Amir and Benartzi also report that the expected return was not
frequently updated from 1988 through 1994.
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To the extent that hypothesized managerial behavior depends exactly on the reported
year-to-year earnings, these empirical results represent a challenge.  But much of the
story depends on the smoothing opportunities and much depends on longer term
expected pension plan costs.  Pension fund managers are fond of saying that they are
long-term investors who hold equity because it substantially reduces the costs of their
employee benefit plans over time.  They invest confidently and substantially in equity
knowing that short term fluctuations will be smoothed away by the actuarial/accounting
process and that, if equity returns are indeed superior, the pension costs over the next
several years will be reduced and corporate earnings will rise.
Thus managers look to the actual returns on equities over time (some positive part of
which drips through the amortization process when the expected return is consciously
conservative) as beneficial while they ignore the financial risks from which they are
generally shielded.  To some degree, the understatement of expected return premia
noted by Amir and Benartzi is a mechanism for acknowledging that personal risk
tolerance is not symmetric.  By upwardly biasing the amortization of lagging returns,
managers mitigate their risk associated with falling markets as distinct from the
shareholders' risk associated with equity volatility.
SFAS 87 disclosures are sufficient to approximate transparent expense
The values of tPA ,  and tPL ,  are available in the SFAS 87 footnote and these are
sufficient to allow analysts to make close approximations to the transparent accounting.
Although these and other data useful for analyst decomposition of the pension
subsidiary were not readily available prior to the adoption of SFAS 87, their subsequent
availability has not led to changes in asset allocation consistent with the transparent
financial pension theories.  Equity allocation since adoption has actually increased
somewhat, although that appears to be explained primarily by market performance.
The issue remains the inconsistency between the reported expense and the available
market values.  Until this is resolved (by transparent accounting), the theories of pension
finance will not be allowed to inform the marketplace.
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Multi-year beta
In Section IV I asserted that none of the items in (4) were stochastic with respect to the
contemporaneous market portfolio and thus were zero-beta.  This is literally true with
respect to each year's pension expense because any equity exposure in tAMT  or
1-tMRV  has been resolved to a certainty as of 1-t .  Further the stochastic experience
in the period ],1[ tt -  will enter into the values of tMRV  through 4+tMRV  and thus into
the pension expense for periods ending at )1( +t  through )5( +t .  The deviations
between 1,
~
-tPAe  and 1
_
-tMRVe  will enter into the AMT  for periods beginning no earlier
than ]1,[ +tt  and then only if the accumulated gains and losses fall outside of the 10%
corridor.
It is easy to conclude that a return series that is uncorrelated with the market portfolio in
each year is uncorrelated over longer periods.  But this is not the case here because the
return series is an artificial construct.  If we were to look at the values of 1
_
-tMRVe  and
1,
~
-tPAe  over multi-year periods, we would find correlation (beta measured over )1( >m -
year periods would be a positive function of a  and of m  when m  is inside the
smoothing range).
The clues to the longer-term positive beta are available to a determined analyst.  But the
analyst so motivated to evaluate the multi-period beta of the returns on plan assets
would certainly be using the market values of tPL ,  and tPA ,  to deduce the transparent
state of affairs.  Thus the existence of a measurable positive multi-year beta adds
virtually nothing to the transparency/opacity debate.
The 10% corridor retards the rate at which observable beta arises over time.  With small
values of a , the corridor may well be sufficient to suppress observable beta for
decades.  With larger a , the market sensitivity of asset returns will manifest itself more
rapidly.  Thus the corridor serves to leverage the suppression of recognizable equity risk.
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This means that the degree of observable risk is no longer as linear as the definitions of
_
e  and 
~
e  would suggest.
The risk associated with equities is substantially, but not fully, suppressed under SFAS
87.  The observable risk is a convex function of a .  This has some implications for a
question not asked in this paper:  if equity risk is so substantially suppressed by SFAS
87, why not invest the plan entirely in equities?  There would appear to be larger
reasons for sponsor reluctance to do so and we will leave this issue for subsequent
research.
VII Empirical Implications
The empirical question of interest raised by the arguments presented herein is not "are
pension plan asset allocations consistent with financial theory?"  We know the answer to
that is "no."  The empirical question to be asked is "do investors use the transparent
model or do they respond to earnings presentations?"  A related, but not identical,
question is "do managers behave as though they believe that investors follow reported
earnings?"  While we may not directly address the second question, we can specify
empirical tests that help answer the first question and we may infer that, if investors do
respond to earnings, managers will believe that they do.  If investors see through to the
transparent result, managers would be well-advised to learn this and exit the equity
mutual fund business.
Further, if shareholders' views are transparent, managers should support changes to the
accounting rules that will reinforce transparency and permit shareholders to understand
manager strategies that take advantage of tax rules and embedded options.  If, instead,
shareholders follow a translucent model, managers may benefit from continued equity
investment and resistance to accounting change.
We consider how investors incorporate pension plan information in their valuations of
publicly traded companies.  Under the transparent model, the market value of pension
assets and liabilities enter into the market value of the corporation, MV :
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PcPc LAFMV )1()1(' 21 tgtgb ---+= (5)
F'b  represents coefficients and factors that explain the cross-section of market values
without explicit consideration of pensions and ct  is the rate of tax paid on corporate
income.  The transparent model implies that 1g  and 2g  both equal one.  It is possible
that 2g  might equal one under opaque or translucent models as well.  We will focus on
the implications that may be derived from the treatment of the assets alone.  A one-sided
test of the hypothesis that 1g  is significantly greater than one would be sufficient to reject
the transparent model.
If we reject the transparent model, then we are encouraged to explore the opaque
model.  The opaque model says that investors value the pension earnings stream in lieu
of the pension assets and liabilities:
Pccc Lr
r
AMT
r
MRV
r
e
FMV
_
54
_
3 )1(
1
)1()1(' tgtgtgb -----+= (6)
As above, we will concentrate on the asset part of the equation and we begin by
reformulating the asset part:
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_
31
_
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_
3 )1()1()()1()1( tgtgtgtg (7)
which recognizes that the market related value of assets may be expressed as an offset
from the market value.  Note that D and   PAMRVe ,,
_
 are all values that vary from
company to company and appear in (or may be derived from) the financial statements51.
A strong form of the opacity hypothesis would require that r  be the riskless rate.  A more
realistic form would allow for greater values.
                                               
51 Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1993) shows how some variables may be derived even when
they are not explicitly presented.
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32g  can tell us how much investors concentrate on earnings versus assets.  If 32g  is not
significantly different from zero, then investors are ignoring the market-related value of
pension assets, MRV .  Alternatively, a finding that 32g  is not significantly different from
31g  implies that the market value of assets, PA , is unimportant and that investors are
looking to the market-related value of assets (i.e., the left-hand side of (7) applies).
03231 >> gg  with significant inequalities implies a mixed or translucent approach to
valuation.
The opaque model predicts that the left-hand of (7) applies and that 3g  equals one.  It
may be supported by values of less than one.  We may interpret such a fractional value
of 3g  as a revision to the discount rate :
MRV
r
e
MRV
r
e
cc
3
__
3 )1()1( g
ttg
¸
-=-
This interpretation, however, loses its power as 3g¸r  approaches 
_
e .
VIII Persistent Mispricing
How can this mispricing have persisted until now?
If the "true" value of the pension subsidiary, consistent with the transparent model,
equals its after-tax assets less liabilities, then any other market value indicates
mispricing.  This mispricing arises from a consensus based on reported earnings.  The
consensus says that a portfolio of publicly traded equities in a pension plan is worth
more than the same portfolio held elsewhere (even after accounting for taxes).  Such a
consensus mispricing should present an arbitrage opportunity for the investor who
knows the "true" value.  A few knowledgeable investors should profit and their actions
should eliminate the arbitrage opportunity.  Thus the mispricing should not persist.
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We suppose that the mispricing exists and we propose to profit from the arbitrage
opportunity.  We recall that the opportunity comes primarily from the difference between
MRVe
_
 and PrA .  In order to profit, we need to establish an arbitrage portfolio which:
· Is neutral with respect to valuation factors other than pension plan assets, i.e.,
_
0' =Fw  where w  is a vector of portfolio weights and F  is a factor matrix including
all valuation factors other than pension plan assets.
· Is neutral with respect to plan assets, i.e., 
_
0' =Aw , where A  is a matrix of plan
assets by type and by firm.
· Minimizes the value of Vw '  where V  is a firm by firm vector equal to MRVerAP
_
- .
Note that we are minimizing a negative value.
Now we wait until the "true" value prevails in the market.  One way in which the values
must true up is plan termination.  Upon termination, MRVerAP
_
-  increases to a value of
zero.  For firms that we are long, this will cause us a loss; for firms we are short, this will
profit us.  Because we have minimized Vw ' , we stand to gain more than we lose.  But
only when all the plans terminate and Vw '  increases to a zero value can we be assured
of our arbitrage profit.
We might profit upon a change in regime.  If and when the FASB adopts a transparent
pension accounting model, MRVerAP
_
-  will effectively rise to a zero value for all firms
at the same time.  While this might happen fairly soon and while it may represent a
genuine opportunity to profit from the existing bias, it does not answer the question that
opened this section.
As long as the present regime prevails, we would-be-arbitrageurs may face an endless
and expensive wait.  Consider what happens if the accounting system remains
unchanged while the size of pension portfolios increases relative to the size of the plan
sponsors.  We can expect that PA  and MRV  will increase and MRVerAP
_
-  will
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become more negative and we will be losers.  Our hoped-for future gains will then be
larger but we may be unable to sustain our portfolio.  This is comparable to the value
investor who buys undervalued stocks only to discover that they can become more
undervalued before they recover.  The stocks may recover, but the investor may not.  It
is also similar to shorting a rational bubble.  The hoped-for-gains when the bubble bursts
may grow while the short investor goes bankrupt.
The rational bubble analogy is quite apt.  The one-period expected return to a buyer
during a bubble equals the cash flow received plus the end of period investment value.
If the bubble persists, the buyer is rewarded in accordance with his expectations.  An
investor who shorts will lose what the buyer gains and unless the date of the bubble
bursting is known in advance, the losses can overwhelm any investor with finite capital.
In the pension case, as in the rational bubble, the would-be-arbitrageur cannot force the
correction to occur on a schedule that assures the success of the arbitrage.
An informative contrast may be struck between the potentially endless mispricing that
derives from accounting that is systemically biased and the temporary mispricing that
may be generated by deliberate earnings management.  Chambers (1999) builds
portfolios based on earnings management and generates abnormal risk-adjusted gains.
This occurs because accounting is a self-correcting process and the deliberate
misrepresentation of one period is generally corrected over a short forward period.
But, one might ask, is not the pension accounting also self-correcting?  Does not the
amortization of gains and losses provide the necessary self-correction?  Interestingly, it
does not.  What the amortization does is to true up the difference between the actual
and expected returns of the past.  It does not limit the self-perpetuating bias about the
future.  As long as the pension plan and the accounting regime persist, there is a
perpetuation of the forward bias created by the anticipation of equity returns without the
appropriate charge for risks not yet borne.
IX Conclusions
I have made the following sequence of arguments:
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· In contrast to modern financial theory, pension assets are substantially invested in
equities.
· The SFAS 87 formulation for pension expense includes a financial bias likely to lead
to systematic overvaluation of corporations whose pension plans invest in equities.
· This bias, though not undetectable, seems to have gone undetected in the pertinent
accounting literature.  And even as FASB moves to remove the bias, it does not
appear that the removal is prompted by awareness of the bias.
· The opacity that enfolds the bias may have a causative role in the determination of
pension asset allocation as corporate financial officers enjoy the benefit of the equity
premium while avoiding much of the concomitant risk.
· For the bias itself to induce equity investment, managers must believe that
financial analysts and investors find reported earnings to be value-relevant.  The
accounting literature finds that earnings in general and pension earnings are
value-relevant.
· Nonetheless, the SFAS 87 footnote provides sufficient information for analysts to
unwind the bias by reference to the disclosed pension asset and liability values at
fair value.  While there is evidence that some analysts are capable of unwinding
the bias, there is little reason to believe that the consensus analyst does so.
· The opacity is very likely to have an enabling role in the allocation of pension assets
to equities.  A variety of perceived advantages to equity investment can be refuted in
a transparent accounting environment.  Notably, the significant tax disadvantages of
equity investing would be exposable in a persuasive fashion.  Because the
accounting is not transparent and because the bias is neither well-publicized nor
well-understood, these exposures and corrections do not occur.
I propose an empirical approach to determining the degree to which the bias is
undetected by the capital markets.
I propose transparent pension accounting.  I believe that such an approach will pave the
way for the lessons of the prior theoretical research to be made manifest to investors.
Accounting for expense that directly reflects the difference in end-of-year market values
of assets and liabilities is necessary to support the financial story telling that will make
the financial theory digestible by investors and analysts.  Consider, many financial
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planners are able to tell their constituent investors to adjust their taxable and tax-
sheltered portfolio allocations to achieve net tax benefits consistent with their general
risk-return balance.  When the corporate story is as easily told, I predict that the theories
of the financial economists will be realized.
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Appendices
A Statement No. 87 of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FAS 87), Accounting for Pensions by Employers
FAS 87 provides the standards of accounting for private employers who sponsor defined
benefit pension plans.  The priority of pension accounting is to recognize pension cost
over the service period of each employee covered by the plan.  This objective leads, in
part, to the choice of an accrued benefit actuarial cost method since such methods do
not spread costs over aggregations of employees.  The chosen method is a modification
of an earlier actuarial method often identified as Projected Unit Credit (PUC).
The Projected Unit Credit method assigns to each year of service for each employee a
pro rata share of the benefit that will have been earned upon separation from service,
reflecting an estimate of any past or future wages that may be taken into account by the
defined benefit formula.  If, for example, an actuary assumes that an employee, hired at
age 35 will retire at age 65 and will have a pay history at age 65 that entitles him to an
annual retirement benefit of $30,000, the method will dictate that $1000 of that benefit be
allocated to each of the thirty years of service.
If that employee is now 50 years of age, the method will recognize $15,000 of the
projected $30,000 benefit as having been accrued to date and will recognize an
additional $1000 to be earned in the current accounting year.  The $15,000 benefit,
multiplied by an appropriate annuity factor and discounted for the period prior to the
commencement of the benefit, becomes the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO)
attributable to this employee.  The PBO  for the plan will be the sum for all current
participants of the plan including the remaining annuity value for all those no longer
actively employed.  The $1000 of benefit to be allocated to the current period will also be
multiplied and discounted by the same factors.  The resulting value is called the Service
Cost (SC)  for this employee and will be aggregated across employees to yield the
plan’s Service Cost for this period.  Using the language of traditional actuarial writings,
Jeremy Gold Biased Methodology Enables Equity Investment May 30, 2000
by Defined Benefit Pension Plans
48
the PBO  would be called the Accrued Liability (AL)  under the PUC method.  The SC
would be called the Normal Cost (NC)  under the PUC method.
Under the traditional PUC method, the annual cost for the plan would then be
determined as: AMTNC + , where the amortizations are periodic payments with a
present value equal to the Unfunded Accrued Liability which is the difference between
AL  and the Actuarial Value of Assets (AAV) : AAVPBO   - .  The AAV  is called the
Market Related Value of Assets (MRV)  under FAS 87.  The amortization amount for the
current period would depend upon the history of events that created the divergence
between the (AAV)  and the (PBO) .  Such items as an existing difference at the
commencement of the plan, or a difference created by changes to the benefit formula of
the plan or to changes in actuarial assumptions, or to differences over time between
actual and assumed experience (actuarial gain or loss) would be amortized over various
fixed periods.
FAS 87 modifies this method in several ways:
· The amortizations in the traditional method include interest on the unfunded accrued
liability in each amortization element.  FAS 87 separates the interest component and
applies it to the PBO  and the MRV  separately.  The unfunded accrued liability
arising from the initial application of FAS 87 and any changes therein attributable to
changes in the plan formula or actuarial assumptions are spread (amortized) over
time without interest.  The gain or loss is accumulated (the asset component of gain
and loss is included herein only after it has entered into the MRV ) and when it
exceeds an optional buffer zone known as a “corridor” it is spread over time without
interest.
· The interest component applied to the PBO  is computed using a discount rate
identified as the “settlement rate”.  This same rate, designated i  below is also used
to compute the PBO  itself and the SC .  It is determined at each valuation date
based on the returns available on high-quality fixed income securities or annuities.
In the sense that it contains no equity risk premium and does not take the plan’s
asset allocation into account, it may be described as a nearly risk-free rate applicable
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to the liability term structure.  ASOP 27 identifies this as a “prescribed rate” and
exempts it from the general ASOP 27 rules pertaining to the selection of an
investment return range.
· The interest component applied to the MRV  is computed using an expected long-
term rate of return on plan assets that is consistent with the ASOP 27 rules.  This
rate designated j  below is generally left unchanged for several years.
The PUC formula may then be reconstituted as: 11 -- -++ tttt jMRVAMTSCiPBO .
Herein, amortizations are without interest.  Amortization of accumulated gains or losses
only considers such gains or losses outside of the corridor.  The asset component of
gains and losses only recognizes the difference in actual versus expected return to the
extent that the difference has been filtered through the averaging process used to
develop the MRV .  As in most ACM’s, the special treatment of the divergence between
asset assumptions and experience amounts to an extra degree of smoothing.
B Excise Taxes on Assets Reverted to Plan Sponsors
Since 198652, an excise tax has been imposed on such reversions in addition to (and not
deductible against, per IRC Section 275(a)6 applied to Chapter 43) the income tax.  This
tax has, since 1990, been at the rate of 20% of reverted assets if a qualified replacement
plan (typically a DC plan would replace a DB plan) is funded with not less than 25% of
the surplus (the residual after settling plan liabilities), and at a 50% rate in the absence
of such replacement.
The impetus for the inclusion of the excise tax was Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-
Ohio, 1977 - 1995) reacting to the reversion of excess plan assets by more than a few
large and visible corporations in the early to mid 1980’s.  The result has been that
substantial plan reversions by taxable corporations are rare.
                                               
52 10% excise tax on asset reversions, IRC Section 4980, added by Pub. L. 99-514, title XI,
Sec. 1132(a), for reversions after December 31, 1985.  Increased to 15% by Pub. L. 100-647,
title VI, Sec. 6069(a), for reversions after December 31, 1988.  Increased to 20% by Pub. L.
101-508, title, XII, Sec. 12001 which further provided a rate of 50% unless the employer used
at least 20% of the otherwise revertible assets to fund immediate benefit increases or at least
25% to fund a qualified replacement plan, for reversions after September 30, 1990.
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To see why, consider a surplus of assets over the cost of settling liabilities equal to $1
for a corporation in the 35% federal income tax bracket.  If the $1 is returned to the
corporation directly, a 50% excise tax is applied in addition to the 35% marginal income
tax rate leaving $.15 after tax.  If the employer elects to divert $.25 towards a qualified
replacement plan, then the revertible amount is reduced to $.75 against which a 55% tax
is imposed (20% excise plus 35% income) so that the after-tax return to the corporation
is $.3375.  Clearly the law intends to induce the latter choice if any reversion is to occur.
The recovery of $.3375 may be compared to a recovery of $.65 before the addition of
IRC Section 4980.
C PBGC Put and Excise Tax Call
The passage of ERISA in 1974 established the PBGC which introduced federal
guarantees for defined benefit pension plans that were unable to meet the promises
made to plan participants.  Sharpe (1976) characterized the existence of the PBGC
guarantee as a put option.  If the premium for the PBGC coverage is not properly
determined, Sharpe concluded that corporations could maximize shareholder interests
by a combination of higher pension liabilities (offered to employees in exchange for
reductions in other compensation), lower pension assets (caused by deliberately smaller
employer contributions) and investment in risky assets.
Since that time the PBGC has defended itself by successfully pursuing legislative action
to raise premiums, to adjust premiums for risk (albeit inadequately), to require faster
funding for poorly funded plans, to increase the amount and status of claims that the
PBGC can make against the sponsor of a terminated plan, to restrict voluntary
termination (put exercise) to plans that are sufficiently funded (thus the put must be out-
of-the-money when exercised by the sponsor) or to insufficient plans sponsored by
“distressed”53 employers.  Nonetheless, for a distressed company with an underfunded
defined benefit plan, the Sharpe PBGC put may provide an incentive for deliberately
risky investment.
                                               
53 P.L. 99-514.  Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986 (SEPPAA) as part of
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
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Prior to the enactment of the first of the Metzenbaum reversion excise taxes (Appendix
B), overfunding of a plan, regardless of cause, was potentially beneficial to shareholders.
As long as the recapture of such excess funding was subject only to income taxes at the
corporate level, the existence of excess assets added to potential shareholder gains.  As
Tepper (1981) shows, if such an PE  were invested in fixed income, shareholders gain;
invested in equity, shareholders face a wash.  With the advent of the excise tax,
however, there exists a tax trap for highly overfunded plans.  If the amount of excess is
so large that it cannot be absorbed by the regular development of newly earned benefit
accruals, it must ultimately be subjected to the excise tax upon termination at some later
date54.  In effect, each plan is short an "excise tax call" option if its assets reach levels
sufficiently in excess of liabilities.
Combining the long position in the Sharpe put and the short position in the excise tax
call, there is a sinusoidal curve to the value of PE  (picture a sine function from 2/p-  to
2/p+ ).  As the assets fall well below the level of the liabilities, the put increases in value
and the PBGC shares in the marginal downside more than it does in the marginal upside
resulting in the convex portion of the sinusoid.  As the assets rise well above the liability
level, the present value of future excise taxes grows in a fashion that creates the
concave portion of the sinusoid.
D Actuarial Standard of Practice No. 27, Selection of
Economic Assumptions for Measuring Pension Obligations
Adopted by the ASB in December, 1996, ASOP 27 supercedes ASOP 4 with respect to
economic assumptions.  Generally, economic assumptions include discount rates,
investment returns, inflation, compensation scales and related factors.  They may be
distinguished from noneconomic (demographic) assumptions relating to rates of death,
disability, termination of employment, retirement, marriage, etc.
For the purposes of this paper, Section 3.6 Selecting an Investment Return Assumption
and a Discount Rate is most relevant.  Sections 3.5 Selecting an Inflation Assumption
                                               
54 This is not to say that this is inescapable.  A company in such a position may get better value
for its surplus by using it to pay for post-retirement health care costs using IRC Section 420
or it may acquire or be acquired by a company with an underfunded plan, etc.
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and Section 3.7 Selecting a Compensation Scale are pertinent to selection of rates of
return used in SFAS 87.
Section 3.6 states in part that “The discount rate is used to determine the present value
of expected future plan payments.  Generally, the appropriate discount rate is the same
as the investment return assumption.  But for some purposes, such as SFAS 87 or
unfunded plan valuations, the discount rate may be selected independently of the plan’s
investment return assumption, if any.”
Section 3.62 Constructing the Investment Return Range details two example methods:
a. Building-Block Method – after identifying asset classes and, for each such class,
estimating real returns and inflation, “compute an average, weighted real-return
range reflecting the plan’s expected asset class mix; and … combine [this] …
with the expected inflation range.”
b. Cash Flow Matching Method – “Under the cash flow matching method, the
expected future investment return range is viewed as the combination of (i) the
internal rate of return on a bond portfolio [of noncallable, high-quality corporate or
U.S. government bonds] with interest and principal payments approximately
matching the plan’s expected disbursements, and (ii) a risk adjustment range.”
The risk adjustment range should reflect “expected future plan investments in
equities or other asset classes besides high-quality bonds.”
Clearly, the prescription given by ASOP 27 is that the equity premium (or other risk
premia) is to be included in the discount rate when the plan is anticipated to invest in
equities and other risky assets.  In the present environment, the equity risk premium
amounts to several percent per annum and equity allocations frequently represent a
majority or near majority of plan assets.  Thus, for such plans today, ASOP 27 holds that
use of the risk-free rate is outside of the actuarial standard of practice.
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